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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Douglas offers valuable insight into state judiciaries and state 
cases regarding the right to vote.1 State judges, after all, do often adjudicate 
significant right-to-vote disputes and construe state laws that may impact the 
right to vote. And state constitutional guarantees, and corresponding judicial 
decisions, regarding that right to vote are too often underappreciated. 
I would like to amplify Professor Douglas’s article by highlighting some 
of the reasons why litigants may prefer or the media may tend to emphasize 
federal voting rights over state voting rights. It is not simply because 
interpretations of voting rights under the federal Constitution would have an 
impact in all fifty states—although, to be sure, the universality is an important 
(and attractive) aspect for litigants.2 Instead, it is because state laws affecting 
the right to vote are far more complicated when one examines how state 
election laws operate. 
This short piece runs orthogonally to Professor Douglas’s article and seeks 
to identify some of the complexity confronting state judges in these voting 
rights disputes, and why state courts may be more or less valuable in particular 
kinds of disputes. State constitutions, direct democracy, and the limited 
authority of the federal courts in some areas create unique challenges and 
opportunities for litigants in many states. Understanding these situations 
informs the scope of state judicial influence in construing the right to vote. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
 1 Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2016). 
 2 Further, the interplay between federal and state election law is an area of growing 
scholarly attention. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral 
College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012); Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation 
Through the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159 (2015); Justin 
Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).  
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II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Professor Douglas rightly notes that many of the most salient recent 
challenges to voter identification laws have occurred in state courts.3 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 
effectively foreclosed facial challenges to photo voter identification laws under 
a line of cases concerning voters’ constitutional right to associate with political 
candidates on the ballot.4 Some justices on the Court characterized the burden 
on voters as “limited,”5 while others described it as a “generally applicable, 
nondiscriminatory voting regulation.”6 Such a slight burden, as characterized 
by the Court, could be justified by a legitimate state interest. The Court 
ultimately found that Indiana could justify the law by pointing to a few 
“legitimate” interests, including modernizing elections, preventing voter fraud, 
and safeguarding voter confidence.7 
For those concerned that voter identification laws impede the right to vote, 
there may be few opportunities left in federal court. Plaintiffs have pursued 
two major prongs of attack. One line of cases has challenged voter 
identification laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.8 And another 
line, as Professor Douglas aptly notes, has occurred in state courts citing state 
constitutional law provisions.9 
But consider a complicating case of a state voter identification law: 
Mississippi. In 2009, the Mississippi state legislature considered a photo voter 
identification law.10 The governor and secretary of state supported a photo 
identification requirement for all voters.11 But the Mississippi House had 
included an exemption for voters 65 and over, and permitted some nonphoto 
forms of identification.12 The governor had indicated his intent to veto such a 
                                                                                                                     
 3 Douglas, supra note 1, at 1. 
 4 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008) (plurality 
opinion). Admittedly, some laws may be more onerous than Indiana’s photo identification 
law and tip the balance in the other direction of another case using a facial challenge under 
the Court’s right of association cases. 
 5 Id. at 202–03 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992)). 
 6 Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 7 Id. at 191–97 (plurality opinion). 
 8 See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Douglas, 
supra note 1, at 22. 
 9 Douglas, supra note 1, at 22. 
 10 Voter ID Bills Die in Mississippi Legislature, PICAYUNE ITEM (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.picayuneitem.com/2009/03/voter-id-bills-die-in-mississippi-legislature/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6BQD-BJYQ]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 H.B. 1533 § 19(7), 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009), http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/ 
documents/2009/pdf/HB/1500-1599/HB1533PS.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP5B-QKRG]. 
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law.13 And the House bill had included an early voting period deemed 
unacceptable to some members of the Senate, which failed to take up the 
bill.14 
If this photo identification bill had simply been enacted as a typical law, 
then a state court in Mississippi, faced with a legal challenge to the law, might 
have construed it in light of the state constitution’s right to vote.15 But after the 
proposed law failed in the state legislature, photo voter identification 
proponents pursued Initiative 27, a ballot measure ultimately approved by the 
voters.16 Initiative 27 amended the state constitution to require all voters, 
except for those in a state-licensed care facility or with a religious objection, to 
show a form of photo identification before voting.17 
Direct democracy can have a dramatic impact on how one construes the 
right to vote. To the extent the right to vote is a standalone constitutional right, 
judicial construction of the right to vote may significantly influence judges’ 
construction of state voting laws. But if a state constitution adds express 
conditions to the right to vote, as Mississippi’s now does, and as other states’ 
constitutions may in the near future,18 the state judge’s role is dramatically 
diminished. 
Of course, a state court can still adjudicate whether the ballot initiative 
complies with state requirements, such as the single subject rule or other 
conditions on ballot initiatives generally.19 And a ballot initiative enacting a 
voter identification law as an ordinary statute rather than a constitutional 
amendment, as occurred in Oklahoma, may still face a traditional challenge 
under the state constitution’s right to vote.20 
Direct democracy, accordingly, may be more modest in its impact when 
initiatives involve statutes rather than constitutional amendments. And their 
                                                                                                                     
 13 Haley Barbour, Governor, State of Miss., State of the State Address (Jan. 13, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/01/mississippi_gov_ 
haley_barbours.html [https://perma.cc/RBR8-VZQD]).  
 14 Voter ID Bills, supra note 10. 
 15 MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 241; see Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State 
Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 101 & n.76 (2014). 
 16 Miss. Sec’y of State, Initiative #27 Voter Identification, http://www.sos.ms.gov/ 
initiatives/Voter%20Identification-PW%20revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3EN-XMTE] 
(informational brochure describing the proposed constitutional amendment); Miss. Sec’y of 
State, Official Tabulation of Vote for Statewide Initiative Measure No. 27, http:// 
www.sos.ms.gov/links/elections/results/statewide/Statewide%20Initiative%20Measure%20
27%20-%20General%20Election%202011%20Results.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM2S-64BN]. 
 17 MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 249-A. 
 18 Associated Press, Missouri: Another Try for a Voter ID Measure, N.Y. TIMES  
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/us/politics/missouri-another-try-for-
a-voter-id-measure.html [https://perma.cc/528Q-M4S6]. 
 19 See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject 
Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983); John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive 
Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399 (2010). 
 20 See, e.g., Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd., 319 P.3d 674, 675 (Okla. 2014). 
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scope can be wide ranging in terms of affecting the right to vote—for instance, 
a 2011 Maine referendum overturned a same day election registration repeal 
that the legislature had enacted and the governor had signed.21 Oregon voters 
approved statewide vote by mail in 1998.22 Indeed, the list of direct democracy 
measures affecting the right to vote is expansive.23 
But the right to vote itself may find conditions within the state constitution 
in ways that give slightly different contours to the right to vote than if such a 
right were defined in more abstract terms or on a standalone basis. It is 
perhaps one reason to find federal courts more tempting for such challenges. It 
is not only the power of a judicial decision in a federal forum to potentially 
apply on a national scale.24 It is, instead, for the simple reason that the 
constitutional right to vote may itself be conditioned within the state 
constitution—and a decision under the federal Constitution would not need to 
heed the state constitution. 
Except, of course, in those cases where the federal Constitution has no 
answer whatsoever, such as, perhaps, the area of voter qualifications. 
III. VOTER QUALIFICATIONS 
Professor Douglas explains that state constitutions typically identify who 
gets to vote, a significant power affecting the right to vote at the most basic 
level.25 The scope of enfranchisement may serve to limit judicial construction 
of state laws affecting voter qualifications. Two situations concerning 
qualifications are useful to consider in this context. The first are those 
situations in which state political actors, and even the people as voters, have 
been deeply involved regarding decisions about the qualifications to vote, 
including in the area of felon and ex-felon disenfranchisement. These 
situations suggest, perhaps, a less robust role for state judges than may 
otherwise be anticipated. The second are those situations in which the 
                                                                                                                     
 21 Eric Russell, People’s Veto of Same-Day Voter Registration Ban Will Be Question 1 
in November, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/09/08/ 
politics/people’s-veto-of-same-day-voter-registration-ban-will-be-question-1-in-november/ 
[https://perma.cc/3TAE-SDR2]; Eric Russell, LePage Signs Bill Banning Same-Day Voter 
Registration, but Critics Vow to Fight, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2011), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/06/21/politics/same-day-voter-registration-banned-but-
critics-vow-to-fight/print/ [https://perma.cc/T3D3-Y888]. 
 22 See Sieon Roux, Oregon Leads the Way in Loving Vote-By-Mail,  
OREGONIAN (Oct. 25, 2008), http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2008/10/Oregon 
_leads_the_way_in_loving.html [https://perma.cc/F68U-T6YK]. 
 23 Cf. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2676 (2015) (addressing the constitutionality of a voter initiative petition that established 
an independent redistricting commission); Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, 
Regulating Democracy Through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election 
Law Reform, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 998 (2005). 
 24 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 7. 
 25 Douglas, supra note 1, at 47. 
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Supreme Court’s recent robust reservation to the states over the power to 
determine voter qualifications means that states constitutions—and state 
courts—are the principle, if not exclusive, source of the right to vote. And that 
suggests that state courts, not federal courts, are particularly useful forums for 
resolution of such disputes. 
Many nonjudicial actors in states regularly take steps that deeply implicate 
qualifications for the right to vote. For instance, an Iowa governor issued an 
executive order granting ex-felons the right to vote in 2005. When another 
governor took office in 2011, he revoked the order and returned to the old 
disenfranchisement standard.26 In 2015, Kentucky’s outgoing governor issued 
an executive order granting the right to vote to all nonviolent ex-felons, which 
the governor-elect cited favorably but reserved the right to reexamine the 
details upon taking office.27 Proponents of a Florida ballot initiative also hope 
to enfranchise ex-felons.28 
And altering qualifications is not simply limited to the domain of ex-
felons. In 2010, for instance, the people of Kansas amended the state 
constitution to revoke from the Kansas legislature the power to exclude people 
with mental illnesses from voting.29 That same year, the people of Vermont 
approved a constitutional amendment permitting seventeen-year-olds to vote 
in primary elections if they turned eighteen before the general election.30 
Before one frets that state courts lack much power in this area,31 it is at 
least worth noting that state executives and voters have been unusually active 
in this area, illustrated from recent events described above, and in historic 
activity in the states.32 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon 
Voting Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 44 (2015); see Muller, supra note 2, 
at 1267 n.188. 
 27 Eric Eckholm, Kentucky Governor Restores Voting Rights to Thousands of Felons, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/kentucky-governor-
restores-voting-rights-to-thousands-of-felons.html [https://perma.cc/QP68-2WVM].  
 28 Dan Sweeney et al., Florida Among Nation’s Toughest Places to Have Voting 
Rights Restored, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/ 
florida/sfl-felon-voting-rights-20150121-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/SU6X-M8GC]. 
 29 Wichita Eagle, Vote ‘Yes’ on Amendment Question 2, DODGE CITY DAILY GLOBE 
(Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.dodgeglobe.com/article/20101016/NEWS/310169983 [https:// 
perma.cc/WM7P-HSA6]. 
 30 Press Release, Jim Condos, Vt. Sec’y of State, New Constitutional Amendment 
Allows 17-Year-Olds to Vote in 2012 Primaries (Feb. 21, 2012), http://vtdigger.org/ 
2012/02/21/new-constitutional-amendment-allows-17-year-olds-to-vote-in-2012-primaries/ 
[https://perma.cc/47WK-VATV] (“[I]n the General Election of 2010, Vermont voters 
overwhelmingly approved a Constitutional Amendment . . . .”); Vermont Proposal 5, As 
Passed by the House and Senate (2008), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/bills/intro/ 
PR0005.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NS2-9LVJ] (codified at VT. CONST. ch. II, § 42). 
 31 Cf. Douglas, supra note 1, at 24 (“Given that many state constitutions have 
sanctioned felon disenfranchisement for years, there is often no plausible state-based legal 
argument against the laws.” (footnote omitted)). 
 32 Muller, supra note 2, at 1281–84. 
70 A RESPONSE TO JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS [2016 
But while state courts may be constrained by their constitutions—
constitutions that governors enforce and voters amend—federal courts may be 
even more constrained in the domain of voter qualifications. In Arizona v. 
Inter Tribal Council, the Supreme Court considered whether the National 
Voter Registration Act (NVRA) preempted Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship 
requirement.33 Arizona, like all states, only permits citizens to vote.34 Arizona 
had enacted law that required election officials to reject voter registration 
applications that lacked sufficient evidence of citizenship. The NVRA required 
Arizona to accept a standard federal registration form, which did not require 
additional documentation. And the Election Assistance Commission, 
responsible for administering the federal registration form, refused to alter the 
form to comply with Arizona’s law. 
Faced with a conflict between Arizona’s law and the NVRA, the Supreme 
Court spoke broadly when it concluded that the Elections Clause formed “no 
part of the power to be conferred upon the national government.”35 Voter 
qualifications, subject to certain constitutional floors,36 are matters left to the 
states, even in federal elections.37 Arizona had attempted to argue that its voter 
registration law was actually a qualification. The Court demurred on this point, 
explaining that it was solely addressing the question of citizenship at a 
qualification.38 The Court went on to uphold the NVRA federal form as a 
proper exercise of congressional power to regulate the “[m]anner” of 
elections.39 
Even if the determination of who is qualified to vote remains in the hands 
of the states, and even if they often remain beyond the reach of the state 
judiciary, qualifications controversies extend to other contexts. Professor 
Douglas rightly identifies photo voter identification laws as one area that 
might fall into the realm of qualifications disputes—the Arkansas Supreme 
Court, for instance, found that a voter identification law impermissibly added a 
qualification to the state constitution’s enumerated qualifications for voters.40 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013). 
 34 Federal law also prohibits aliens from voting in federal elections. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 611(a) (2012). But that law may exceed the scope of federal power in this area. See infra 
note 35; see also Derek Muller, Is a Federal Ban on Alien Voting Unconstitutional?, 
EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY BLOG (June 21, 2013), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/ 
2013/6/is-a-federal-ban-on-alien-voting-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/FCX5-K3HS]. 
 35 Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2258 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 371 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 36 See Muller, supra note 2, at 1281. 
 37 Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2258; see also id. at 2258 n.8 (concluding that Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 143 (1972), could not support the proposition that a federal law 
could control the qualifications to vote in federal elections). 
 38 Id. at 2259 n.9. 
 39 Id. at 2267–68 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 40 Douglas, supra note 1, at 20–21 (identifying argument in Arkansas that a photo 
voter identification law added a qualification beyond the enumerated qualifications in the 
state constitution); see also Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844, 853–54 (Ark. 2014). 
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Indeed, Texas has recently (unsuccessfully) defended its photo voter 
identification law from a Section 2 challenge precisely on the basis that it is a 
qualification to vote.41 And Arizona, facing subsequent challenges to its 
registration law alongside states like Kansas, has attempted to revive the claim 
that registration is a voter qualification.42 
States seeking to escape federal regulation of their election laws may go 
too far in these claims. They may face a challenge under their own state 
constitutions. Because state constitutions usually define the exclusive set of 
qualifications for voter eligibility, state laws aggressively defended as 
qualifications in federal court may be deemed improper additional 
qualifications beyond the scope of the state constitution—precisely what took 
place in Arkansas. Even though judicial review of such a statute would not 
necessarily occur under a state constitution’s broader language regarding the 
right to vote, it would certainly devolve to the state judiciary to determine the 
propriety of such laws. And it may be the case that some state laws add 
qualifications to the enumerated constitutional qualifications of voters, which 
would place the judiciary in the most likely position to evaluate the claims of 
otherwise-eligible voters affected by such laws. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Professor Douglas notes that judicial ideology and judicial selection can 
impact how the right to vote is construed.43 There are many commentaries on 
state judicial elections or retention votes generally, from discussions about the 
system itself44 to the voter behavior in those elections.45 And Professor 
                                                                                                                     
 41 See, e.g., Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 27, Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 
(S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 2:13-CV-193), 2013 WL 6046807 (“The States also hold a 
constitutionally protected prerogative to establish the qualifications for voting in state and 
federal elections. That includes the right to require voters to obtain and present photo 
identification when appearing to vote at the polls.” (citation omitted)); Veasey, 71 
F. Supp. 3d at 632, aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 
796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted No. 14-41127, 2016 WL 929405 (5th 
Cir. Mar. 9, 2016); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; cf. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at 2258 
(“Prescribing voting qualifications, therefore, ‘forms no part of the power to be conferred 
upon the national government’ by the Elections Clause, which is ‘expressly restricted to the 
regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections.’” (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 60, supra note 35, at 371)). But the Supreme Court has suggested that 
identification laws may not be voter qualifications. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 193 (2008) (plurality opinion); see also Derek T. Muller, The 
Play in the Joints of the Election Clauses, 13 ELECTION L.J. 310, 319–20 (2014). 
 42 Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2891 (2015). 
 43 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 32–47 (Part IV). 
 44 See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except All 
the Others that Have Been Tried, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (2005). 
 45 See, e.g., Jordan M. Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1443. 
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Douglas’s article refines the discussion to the area of election law in a 
thoughtful way. 
But state courts are sometimes complicated places for litigants. Direct 
democracy can cure some of the issues that Professor Douglas identifies.46 Or 
it can complicate them, by adding constitutional conditions to the right to vote. 
State constitutions can make the state judicial forum less hospitable in the 
event that the state constitution binds the judge’s construction of the right to 
vote. Or they can make the state forum more hospitable, as states provide 
unique opportunities that federal courts simply cannot provide.47 But state 
courts can significantly—too often in underappreciated ways—shape the right 
to vote, and Professor Douglas ably points us toward thinking more critically 
about their role. 
                                                                                                                     
 46 See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 1, at 3 & nn.11–12 (describing the aspiration for a 
“broad” and “robust” right to vote). 
 47 Cf. Douglas, supra note 1, at 5–7 (describing in Part II.A the volume of state 
election law litigation). 
